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process. Implicit in this assumption is that the bargainIntroduction 
would only be worthwhile if the disclosures made in the
patent specification are of such character or quality asne of the theoretical premises of the patent system
would confer a net value on the society, especially inO is that it enhances the dissemination of valuable
respect of new technologies, industries, or research. Ininformation by assuring creators of new inventions a
effect, beneath the apparent legalese of the patent systemlimited monopoly for the exploitation of their inven-
is a policy of encouraging disclosure of valuable informa-tions. As a tool of state policy, the patent system seeks to
tion, enrichment of the public domain, and concomitantcatalyze the industrialization of the state, disclosure of
welfare of both the inventor and the larger society.information by inventors, and ultimately, the enrich-
ment of the public domain in a manner that benefits In recent times, however, developments resultingboth the inventor and the society. Consequently, the from the internationalization of the United States’ patentpatent system is often characterized as a form of contract law have encouraged biotechnology firms and pharma-between the inventor and the state. 1 As a consideration ceutical companies to argue in favour of stringent patentfor disclosing the secret of the invention, so this theory laws and broad patent claims. 5 In the same context, theresays, the state grants the inventor limited monopoly over is a growing concern among patent lawyers and policy-the use of the invention. The implicit assumption in this makers that the major patent offices of the world aresimplified theoretical construction of a complex system relatively lax and permissive in issuing patents onis that the inventor and the society benefits mutually biotechnological products without demonstrable utility.from the bargain. There is an emerging consensus among scholars of the
Although this theory, indeed romantic idealization patent system that mechanical inventions receive a
of the patent system, has been assailed on several fronts tougher scrutiny for utility than their genetic or
by a formidable school of critical scholars2 of the patent biotechnological counterparts. The convergence of these
system,3 it nonetheless constitutes the major rhetorical strong undercurrents poses severe challenges to the
flag which advocates or supporters of the patent system social utility of patent regimes and the fairness of the
readily wave before skeptics as the raison d’etre of the patent system as a whole. Given that the normative basis
patent system.4 Without revisiting the merits or other- or theoretical justification of the patent system is that
wise of this unresolved debate, the central and undis- patents are a contract between the inventor and the
puted tenet of patent laws is that the exclusive rights public for the disclosure of valuable information to the
granted by the patent are delimited and defined by the public and protection of the inventor’s investments, a
specification supporting the patent application. It is the patent of uncertain utility is a fraud on the public. If the
utility embedded in the patent specification which acts patent system performs its role, other inventors or
as a consideration for the enormous limited monopoly researchers would be able to build upon valuable infor-
conferred on the inventor and which the state is often mation to produce better products for the benefit of
willing to lend its authority and processes to protect and society. Genetic patents in particular are thus intended
enforce. to provide access to innovations in health care and
In theory thus, patent holders may lawfully use this genetic research. Consequently, where patents are issued
market exclusivity and assurance of state protection to on genetic materials without demonstrable utility the
generate profits and recoup the costs of the inventive society is short-changed, the public domain is cluttered
†LL.B., (Nig.), B.L., (Lagos), LL.M., J.S.D. (Dalhousie). Assistant Professor, UBC Law School, Vancouver. This article is dedicated to Professor Teresa Scassa for
her many years of encouragement.
‡B.Sc., (Victoria), LL.B. Candidate, 2004, UBC Law School, Vancouver.
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84 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
with speculative patents, and the patent system becomes Interestingly, when this issue came up before the
a clog rather than a catalyst for social welfare. 6 It is Canadian Supreme Court, the Court opined that ‘‘the
arguable that the contemporary trend in issuance of pat- presumption adds little to the onus already existing, in
ents to genetic materials when such materials are not the usual way, on the attacking party’’. 14 In effect, the
accompanied with sufficient disclosure of their utility preponderant judicial tenor in Canada is in favour of a
encourages speculative patenting and eventually turns presumption of validity of patents. What is more dis-
the patent system into rubbish. turbing is the impression created by the courts across the
world that a challenge to the validity of a patent is often
In addition, the granting of speculative genetic pat- the desperate argument of an infringer. In this context,
ents which fail the requirement of the rules on specifica- the need for patent examiners to be very rigorous when
tion of inventions7 grossly distorts the evidential which is evaluating the completeness of an application for pat-
at the base of the integrity and efficiency of the patent ents, particularly in respect of genetic matter, can hardly
system, particularly in patent validity litigations. This is be overemphasized. Members of the public rely on
the position notwithstanding the fact that section 53(1) patent examiners to exercise their best possible judg-
of the Canadian Patent Act, 8 and similar provisions in ment in the issuance of patents, especially genetic pat-
other patent legislations across the world, provide that a ents. Consequently, where patent offices are slack or lax
patent is void ‘‘if the specification and drawing contains in their responsibility to ensure that genetic patent appli-
more or less than is necessary for obtaining the end for cations satisfy the requirements of sufficient disclosure
which they purport to be made and the omission or and utility, the patents issued unfairly place the burden
addition is willfully made for the purpose of mis- on the person attacking the validity of the patent. In the
leading’’. 9 In Canada, as in other patent law jurisdictions, light of these developments, the question arises as to
the power to void or invalidate a patent rests with the what policies ought to be put in place to deal with the
Federal Court (or similar courts) and not with the indi- emergent trend of speculative genetic patents as they
vidual member of the public who may believe that a impact on the integrity of the patent system and on
particular genetic patent is of dubious validity. health care and research.
Apart from the fact that courts are the ultimate Increasing concerns over the legal validity of genetic
determinants of the validity or otherwise of a patent patents and licensing of genes and genetic material tran-
issued by the pertinent patent office, it has to be empha- scend theoretical or scholarly discomfort with tardy
sized that there is a statutory presumption of validity, application of patent law by patent examiners. Genetic
albeit weakly worded, in favour of patents already issued testing and research has in modern times become
by a patent office. In other words, no matter the reserva- increasingly critical to health care delivery. The broad
tions any person may have about a particular patent, interpretation that has been granted to gene patents and
such a patent is presumed valid until the courts say the creeping culture of patent now and litigate later,
otherwise. According to s. 43(2) of the Canadian Patent particularly in Canada and the U.S., has led to what
Act, many commentators feel is the emergence of a predatory
patent regime. As restrictive licensing practices combine[A]fter the patent is issued, it shall in the absence of any
with heated races to the patent office by researchers, theevidence to the contrary, be valid and avail the patentee and
the legal representatives of the patentee for the term men- immediate consequences include the monopolization of
tioned in section 44 or 45, whichever is applicable. 10 clinical testing, uncertainty of the scope of patents, exces-
sive commercialization of research, 15 and distortion ofHowever, in Canada, opinion is divided as to
the academic research agenda.whether the presumption in question is an evidential
On both the legal and policy levels, the emergentburden to be discharged by the defendant in a patent
trend threatens the integrity and essence of the patentvalidity trial or an incidental burden of introducing pre-
regime. It is a fundamental policy of patent regimes thatliminary evidence. 11 According to Dube J., ‘‘the burden is
patentees, competitors, and the public are entitled toon the defendant challenging a patent to show, on the
definite functions of a patent specification. Given thatusual standard of the balance of probabilities, that a
specification lies at the ‘‘heart of the patent system’’, 16patent is invalid. The burden is heavy and is not easy to
there is a compelling need to rethink the excessivelyovercome’’. 12 On the other hand, Pratte J. observed
liberal construction of patent specifications and therather ambiguously in Rubbermaid (Canada) Ltd. v.
laxity of the patent offices, particularly in respect ofTucker Plastic Products Ltd that:
genetic matter. Unless the patent system is made to per-
[O]nce the party attacking the patent has introduced the form its vaunted function of enriching the publicevidence, the Court, in considering evidence and in deter-
domain in exchange for limited monopolies, the publicmining whether it establishes the invalidity of the patent
must not take presumption into account. It cannot be said would suffer from a ‘‘bargain process’’ heavily weighted
that the presumption created by [now 45] is, as a rule, either in favour of questionable patented genetic materials. As
easy or difficult to overcome; in some cases, the circum-
stances may be such that the presumption will be easily
rebutted, while in other cases the same result may be very
difficult or even impossible to obtain. 13
✄
R
E
M
O
V
E
U
se
rn
am
e:
 m
or
ri
so
n
D
at
e:
 2
4-
N
O
V
-0
3
T
im
e:
 6
:5
8
Fi
le
na
m
e:
 D
:\r
ep
or
ts
\c
jlt
\a
rt
ic
le
s\
02
_0
2\
02
02
_m
gb
eo
ji.
da
t
Se
q:
 2
The Scramble for Speculative and Overly Broad Genetic Patents 85
the Canadian Supreme Court warned in Apotex Inc. v. Patentability of Genetic Sequences 
Wellcome Foundation Ltd:
rguably, the patent system was not originally[I]t is not enough for a patent owner to be able to buttress
speculation with post-patent proof, and thereby turn dross A designed for protection of life forms. 19 Rather, early
into gold. Utility is an essential part of the definition of an patent systems, especially in the United Kingdom, conti-
invention. A policy of patent first and litigate later unfairly nental Western Europe, and North America were domi-puts the onus of proof on the attackers to prove invalidity,
nated almost exclusively by machines and mechanicalwithout the patent owner’s ever being put in a position to
devices. 20 Discoveries, principles of nature, and naturalestablish validity. Unless the inventor is in a position to
establish utility as of the time the patent is applied for, on products were all debarred from the range of patentable
the basis of either demonstration or sound prediction, the subject-matter. 21 However, as early industrialization
Commissioner ‘‘by law’’ is required to refuse the patent. 17 evolved from machines and extended to chemicals,
This paper will not directly address the ethical con- pharmaceuticals, and lately, biotechnology, the patent
siderations of allowing patents on human genetic regime expanded its scope of patentable subject-matter
sequences, although this continues to be a controversial to accommodate the claims of those emergent indus-
debate in itself. 18 Rather, the aim is to consider the tries. 22
legality of such gene patents and the effects such patents
Although the nature of this (r)evolution in thehave on biomedical research and health care delivery in
patent system is outside the scope of this paper, it sufficesdefinitive terms through an analysis of current develop-
to note at this stage that the expansion of the patentments and research relating to the subject. The operation
system to accommodate growths in the chemical, phar-of current intellectual property regimes regulating such
maceutical, and biological fields often emanated frompatents will be examined, and amendments to these
judicial interpretation of patentable subject-matter ratherlegal systems will be considered. An emphasis will be
than express legislative adjustments. 23 Thus, the exposi-placed on identifying practical concerns rather than
tion of what constitutes patentable subject-matter hasbroad, general issues that do not directly address prac-
largely remained a judicial creation rather than a legisla-tical implications. In concluding our analysis, we propose
tive function. Attempts to limit the scope of patentablea set of policy options which the patent system and
subject-matter to the express letters of the law have oftenpublic institutions may pursue to mitigate the excesses of
come to a miserable end as courts often embrace inter-an exuberant and liberal patent system.
pretative techniques which yield modern meanings to
In the light of the recent sequencing of the human what constitutes acceptable patentable subject-matter.
genome, and the concurrent genomic mapping of sev-
Hence, there is merit in the observation of theeral other important organisms essential as research
Canadian Patent Appeal Board in Re Application of Abi-models in bioscience research, this topic is of consider-
tibi that ‘‘throughout the world various judicial bodies,able importance. As gene sequences and complementary
without changes in legislation, have gradually alteredprotein structures are increasingly characterized in
their interpretation of statutory subject-matter to adapt ithumans and other related organisms, the elucidation of
to new developments on technologies, and current con-basic molecular pathways and disease-related mecha-
cepts of industrial activity’’. 24 It was largely within thisnisms will result in an exponential increase in
paradigm that the courts have, over the years, resolvedbiomedical and biotechnological innovations. The fun-
many fundamental issues in patent law in favour of newdamental nature of health care will change as common
industries. In modern times, the biotechnology and phar-diseases and genetic predispositions will be characterized
maceutical industries have been the greatest beneficiariesand treated on a molecular level. It is therefore essential
of the inherent capacity of patent systems to embracethat the processes by which these innovations are devel-
modern conceptions of patentable subject-matter. 25oped and shared benefit both society and innovators to
the greatest possible extent in a manner that is consistent The predilection of the patent system to adjust to
with the tenets and policy anchors of patent law. new conceptions of patentability is often reflected in the
This paper is divided into five parts, of which part epochal deployments of capital in the society. In the past
one is introductory. Part two examines the law on pat- five or six decades, this phenomenon is probably best
entability of genetic sequences. It argues that in recent exemplified in the fine distinctions which the courts
decades, patent law across the globe has been gradually have gradually imposed on the patentability of purified
diluted to accommodate the huge capital investment in products of nature on one hand and products of nature
biomedical research. The relaxation of the standards of per se on the other hand.26 Originally, patent systems
patentability has in turn led to the proliferation of across the world purported to debar the patentability of
biomedical patents. Part three takes the analysis further products of nature. However, with the rise of sophisti-
by examining the impact of this trend on biomedical cated methods of pharmaceutical research and manufac-
research, the public domain, and access to health care. In ture, the major patent systems of the world have drawn a
part four, we propose a set of solutions to the problems distinction between products of nature per se and
identified and analyzed earlier. The paper concludes its refined products of nature. While the latter is patent-
analysis in part five. able, 27 the former is not.
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86 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
Interestingly, the patenting of refined or purified the United States’ National Institutes of Health (NIH)
products of nature started with the patent on acetyl sali- and the Association of American Medical Colleges
cylic (aspirin) in 1910. 28 Thus, on the basis of the hypoth- (AAMC) have recently argued, patents on homologous
esis that purified or refined natural substances are physi- gene sequences (as they are called) are flawed because ‘‘a
cally and chemically distinct from raw products of difference in a single base pair in a gene sequence can
nature, 29 the courts in the United States of America and have important functional implications’’. 42
elsewhere have upheld the patenting of purified natural
Granting patents on gene sequences with unknownsubstances such as vitamin B12, 30 purified pros-
functions, even when the function of a gene homologuetaglandins, 31 adrenalin, 32 et cetera. 33 Intriguingly, the
is known, is speculative and presumptuous. In effect,argument that purified natural products are patentable
such a patent becomes a fishing or hunting licence, anwas made in respect of purified tungsten34 (in the case of
instrument of speculation, rather than performing itsGeneral Electric Co. v. Deforest Radio Co.35) but the
avowed role as a facilitator of disclosure of specific andCourt rejected it. It is on the theory that genetic mater-
useful information by inventors to the public. 43 Simplyials are akin to chemical compounds that patents are
put, the patenting of gene fragments of unknown utilityincreasingly issued to such genetic matter.
flies in the face of basic patent law and short-changes the
Given the current trend in patenting genetic matter, public. The impact of such speculative and uncertain
there remains a question on whether such materials are patents on the larger society is decidedly negative. As
legally patentable. 36 It is not enough that a particular Binnie J. warned in respect of patents with indetermi-
substance sought to be patented is a chemical, it must nate and unknown functions:
also have a demonstrable utility. Generally speaking,
[T]he patent system is designed to advance research andgenes or genetic sequences as they exist in vivo, or as
development and to encourage broader economic activity.they exist in nature, are not per se patentable. However,
Achievement of these objectives is undermined however ifon the basis that gene fragments are chemicals, patent competitors fear to tread in the vicinity of the patent
protection is available for isolated and purified DNA because its scope lacks a reasonable measure of precision
and certainty. A patent of uncertain scope becomes a publicfragments, full length genes, and the protein products of
nuisance. Potential competitors are deterred from workinggenes, provided their functions are known. In effect,
in areas that are not in fact covered by the patent evenmodern patent law treats DNA material similarly to pat- though costly and protracted litigation (which in the case of
entable chemical compounds that have been derived patent disputes can be very costly and protracted indeed)
from natural resources, provided, of course, the function might confirm that what the competitors propose to do is
entirely lawful. Potential investment is lost or otherwiseof such chemicals, albeit of biochemical origins, are
directed. Competition is ‘chilled’. The patent owner is get-known and specifically identified. 37
ting more of a monopoly than the public bargained for. 44
By law, in order to receive a patent for a genetic
In addition to patents on full gene sequences, pat-sequence, the patent application must satisfy the require-
ents have been granted in Canada and the U.S. forments of novelty and utility under s. 2 of the Canadian
expressed sequence tags (ESTs), complementary DNAPatent Act, and the non-obviousness requirement under
(cDNA), and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). 45s. 28.3. 38 The Canadian Intellectual Property Office posi-
ESTs are short fragments of larger genes that have ation that genetic sequences may qualify as patentable
variety of uses in molecular biology, including the identi-subject matter was recently reinforced by the Canadian
fication of complementary full length genes and similar,Federal Court of Appeal in a decision granting Harvard
homologous gene sequences within and among species.University a patent for claims on a transgenic mouse. 39
cDNA is a widely used research tool for methods such asJustice Rothstein, speaking for the majority, stated that
genome mapping. SNPs constitute single nucleotide vari-‘‘DNA is a physical substance and is therefore matter’’. 40
ations within genes between and among organisms.Although the decision was ultimately overturned by the
Single nucleotide variation within a gene can result inSupreme Court of Canada, which held that higher life
disease development and is implicated in certain cancerforms are not patentable subject matter under the defini-
development and genetic predispositions to disease.tion of ‘‘invention’’ in s. 2 of the Act, the holding did not
SNPs are used frequently to locate chromosome markersaffect the current understanding that genetic sequences
to identify genes implicated in disease.with known functions or utility are patentable subject
matter under the Canadian Patent Act. 41 Of late, however, the position in the United States46
However, what is troubling about some patented and Germany47 is that the patent offices will henceforth
gene sequences is that unlike other chemicals with apply a stricter regime on patentability of gene
known utility, the functions of certain genetic materials sequences. This welcome return to a more rigorous stan-
are often unknown even when scientists know the func- dard of patentability is largely born out of the concern
tion of a similar gene sequence. Yet, some patent offices that, apart from their apparent illegality, broad gene pat-
have been issuing genetic patents on the basis of ents hinder the exploitation of newly discovered func-
homology rather than specific and ascertained utility or tions for DNA sequences. In addition, there is a growing
function. This practice is inconsistent with patent law. As apprehension that broad gene patents stifle research in
✄
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The Scramble for Speculative and Overly Broad Genetic Patents 87
the biomedical and pharmaceutical fields. 48 These con- The implications of overly broad gene patents on
cerns deserve a closer analysis. health care across the globe are gradually moving from
the periphery to the core of rising concerns on the future
of public access to health care. A recent study researched
the adoption and use by U.S. laboratories of genetic
Effects of Broad Genetic Patents on testing for a common hereditary disorder. 55 The results
found that 30 percent of the laboratories surveyed ceasedHealth Care and Biomedical
to provide or develop the test as a result of an exclusiveResearch 
licence granted on the patents for clinical testing ser-
here is an increasing number of patents being vices. 56 A similar study was conducted to research theT issued in the U.S., Canada, and abroad covering licensing activities of private firms holding patents on
patents implicated in human disease, and diagnostic tests genetic diagnostic tests. 57 The results found the patents
developed for these diseases are being commercialized included in the study that had been licensed were
by biotech companies. Many laboratories have avoided entirely under exclusive terms. 58 These results and other
offering such diagnostic tests and developing further published data59 on genetic patents involving disease
research on these genes because of concerns of patent illustrate a trend toward a monopolization of diagnostic,
infringement. This has also raised concerns by numerous therapeutic, and research purposes concerning a partic-
groups that such restrictions will inevitably inhibit fur- ular gene. Access to genetic-based diagnostics and thera-
ther research into disease-related mechanisms of gene pies will become increasingly important as biomedical
function. There is thus a compelling need to strike the research and development provides an entirely novel
appropriate balance between public and commercial approach to disease treatment. Beyond issues of access to
interests. 49 health care, it is becoming obvious that, rather than pro-
mote research and inventiveness as most proponents ofEmerging evidence shows that public and private
the patent system assert is its raison d’eˆtre, broad genelaboratories may be restricted from offering certain diag-
patents issued on genetic sequences of doubtful ornostic tests for disease and genetic predisposition due to
unknown utility stifle and hamper research.costly licence and royalty fees. This is of particular impor-
tance to national health care systems. Canada’s social
Some studies have shown that patents on geneticpolicy towards health care subsidizes a significant pro-
material have affected researchers’ willingness to exploreportion of health care treatment. The Canadian heath
new areas of research and reduced the level of communi-care system is in a financial crisis, and providing access to
cation within the scientific community. 60 In a survey ofinnovative medical treatments and diagnostics in some
approximately 2,100 life science researchers, 19.8 perinstances has proven extremely costly. 50
cent of the respondents reported delaying publications
In 2002, the Ontario provincial government refused of research results for greater than six months in order to
to recognize patents held by a U.S.-based biotechnology prepare and file patent applications, to provide time for
firm, Myriad Genetics. 51 Myriad Genetics holds nine U.S. patent prosecution, to protect their intellectual property
patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2, genes involved in breast rights, or to resolve contentious intellectual property
and ovarian cancer susceptibility, and similar patents ownership issues. The study also found that research
have been granted in Canada and Japan and filed in the teams actively pursuing commercialization of university
United Kingdom and Europe. The test costs approxi- research and partnered with private firms were corre-
mately $1,150 in Ontario in Canadian dollars. Myriad lated with significant publication delays. Variables associ-
notified the provincial government of the firm’s patent ated with the practice of refusing to share results
rights and mandated that the province send samples to included human genetic research and involvement in
Myriad laboratories for testing, costing approximately university research commercialization. The researchers
$3,850 in U.S. dollars for each test. 52 concluded that withholding results was not a common
The British Columbia government has ceased diag- practice among life science researchers, but was much
nostic testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2, and has sus- more prevalent among faculty research groups pursuing
pended funding for the test across Canada. Quebec has university technology transfer opportunities and corpo-
agreed to send samples to Myriad laboratories, and rate partnerships. What makes the situation even more
Alberta has continued to provide testing. The remaining outrageous is that a large number of the patented gene
provinces are not offering the diagnostic test. The signifi- sequences were obtained at a time when patents were
cance of Myriad’s refusal to license the BRCA1 and granted on gene sequences without identified functions.
BRCA2 tests cannot be underemphasized given the prev- As Bruce Alberts and Sir Aaron Klug have rightly pointed
alence of breast and ovarian cancer among women.53 out:
Early diagnosis and knowledge of genetic predisposition
[T]he intention of some university and commercial interestsconsiderably increases treatment effectiveness. These rea-
to patent the DNA sequences themselves, thereby stakingsons may have compelled research institutions in Ger- claim to large numbers of human genes without necessarily
many, the Netherlands, and France to challenge Myriad’s having a full understanding of their functioning, strikes us as
BRCA patent applications. 54 contrary to the essence of patent law. 61
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Apart from bringing the patent system to disrepute, genetic patents, including patents on ESTs and partially
the emergent practice flies in the face of common characterized gene sequences, may be hindering the
notions that patents constitute a form of fair bargain and development of downstream research products.
contract between the inventor and the society. The Upstream intellectual property rights delay the develop-
reality with such gene patents is that they often short- ment of effective treatment methods involving that spe-
change the society by granting the inventor large and cific gene, and may further interfere with research
expansive rights over ‘‘areas’’ or ‘‘spaces’’ which have involving related pathways that involve the patented
indeterminable boundaries and thus unfairly constrict subject matter. 69
the ability of members of the public in conducting
research in such ‘‘areas’’ or ‘‘spaces’’. As Bruce Alberts and In practical terms, the exclusive rights granted by
Sir Aaron Klug again observe: patents restrict use of patented subject matter and
increase transaction costs necessary to access such infor-[T]hose who would patent DNA sequences without real
knowledge of their utility are staking claims not only to mation. Biomedical research necessarily requires access
what little they know at present, but also to everything that to a number of resources, and patent protection may
might later be discovered about the genes and proteins often become an obstacle to access. The effective result isassociated with the sequence. They are, in effect, laying
an under use of restricted resources because of expansive,claim to a function that is not yet known or a use that does
if not dubious patents. In biomedical research the effectsnot yet exist. This may be in current shareholders’ interests.
But it does not serve society well. 62 can be demonstrated through the proliferation of over-
lapping patent claims and licences. Patents coveringGiven that scientists are still at the very early stages
characterized, full length genes may provide viable com-of understanding the human genetic sequence, it is vital
mercial products, including diagnostic genetic tests andthat researchers have access to the full genome without
therapeutic treatments including pharmaceuticals.the encumbrances of overly broad genetic patents. 63 The
effects of patenting genetic material also affect research
However, both the Canadian Intellectual Propertyagendas within universities, especially in Canada and the
Office (CIPO) and the United States Patent and Trade-U.S. This relates to the growing relationships between
mark Office (USPTO) have issued patents on ESTs. Theprivate industry and university research, especially in the
corresponding gene, protein product, and biological roleareas of biotechnology and biomedical research. How-
of gene fragments are not fully characterized, and gener-ever, a full treatment of the complex issues arising out of
ally only putative functions are proposed on the basis ofcorporate-university relations is beyond the scope of this
homology-based comparisons with conserved gene fami-paper. 64
lies. As shown earlier, slight differences in gene
There are also issues of inefficiency in resource allo- homology may produce radically different results. Pre-
cation raised by overly broad genetic patents. Thus, some liminary sequence information is invaluable in prelimi-
commentators have analyzed the current trend in nary research initiatives, but granting exclusive intellec-
genetic patent grants in terms of resource allocation and tual property rights over isolated gene fragments does
control. 65 During the second half of the 20th century the not afford valuable commercial products and research
original ‘‘commons model’’ of biomedical research, in benefits to the scientific community. The research and
both Canada and the U.S., has developed into the cur- development necessary to produce biomedical diag-
rent ‘‘privatization model’’. 66 Under the commons nostic genetic tests and therapeutic treatments requires
model a significant amount of upstream biomedical the use of multiple gene fragments. Access to gene
research was developed from public research institutions sequences requires significant transaction costs under an
and universities and results were circulated widely intellectual property regime in which patents are granted
within the scientific community. 67 Most research and on multiple gene fragments. 70
development was published and remained in the public
domain, and commercial downstream products The development of novel therapeutic agents byarrived. 68 private firms requires a process of receptor screening. An
The 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a move established practice in the pharmaceutical industry is the
towards private sector research and development, and screening of large numbers of drug candidates in order
with this trend arose the importance of protecting intel- to assess possible effects on cellular function. Similarly,
lectual property with patents. A necessary consequence candidates that are selected for further pre-clinical
of privatization was a large influx of capital from the research are screened with classes of receptor families to
private sector, and a concurrent decline in public assess therapeutic effects. Use of patented receptors
funding. A similar trend has occurred within university requires obtaining an extensive group of licensing agree-
departments, as private funding of university research ments to avoid patent infringement suits, and private
projects and growing university-corporate ventures have firms cannot qualify under research exemptions in devel-
changed the fundamental nature of university research. oping commercial products. Consequently, pharmaceu-
As private control of biomedical research and develop- tical and biotechnology firms normally pursue research
ment continues, a rapid increase in patents on upstream involving fewer patent licensing restrictions or proceed
✄
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The Scramble for Speculative and Overly Broad Genetic Patents 89
further into clinical testing without adequate in vitro number of universities have entered into corporate rela-
studies. 71 tionships and developed university technology transfer
initiatives. 75 As public research funding continues toA further implication of granting patents over con-
diminish and universities continue to pursue commer-current gene fragments involves licensing agreements
cial research agendas, fundamental biochemical researchand research ventures entered into during the period
will be limited. Commercially-oriented research will notbetween the filing of a patent application and the patent
provide broad-based contributions to science, and like-issuance. The rapid development of industry research
wise innovations with maximum benefit to society willnecessitates that firms and universities enter into
be limited. 76 These wide implications of speculative andlicensing agreements and develop research strategies
overly broad genetic patents compel a need to rethinkbased on pending patent applications. Research groups
contemporary practices and laws surrounding the issu-establishing research and development protocols are
ance of genetic patents.restricted further by possible patent claims covered by
pending applications.
Further, patent licensing of upstream genetic
sequences may result in numerous overlapping rights in Proposed Solutions to the Problems
downstream commercial products. License agreements Associated With Speculative Genetic
may contain conditions granting the licensee royalties in Patents future commercial products developed by licensors,
reciprocal licences on commercial developments, or he Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee
options to acquire reciprocal licences. 72 Practical conflicts T (CBAC)77 and the Government of Ontario have
can arise when overlapping claims to downstream prod- recently issued reports concerning genetic patents con-
ucts are created. In effect, upstream genetic patent taining a number of recommended amendments to
holders may acquire rights to subject matter outside of existing Canadian patent law.78 These responses take the
the original patent claims, and exert control over down- form of changes to patent office practice, judicial treat-
stream research and product development. ment and application of the law, and new legislation or
regulatory schemes introduced by Parliament. AlthoughPatents over gene sequences may prevent other
some groups have called for a complete restriction onresearchers from collaborating and contributing to
patenting of any genetic material, this alternative isproteomics research, the characterization of protein
impractical and may not be necessary. As noted by astructure and function. The field of proteomics will
group of well-known commentators in this area, ‘‘. . . aeventually replace genomics as the major field of
radical alteration in patent law . . . is unlikely to be ten-biomedical research, and will provide a novel array of
able, because there are too many forces pushing theprotein-based platform technologies and products. Pat-
patent agenda forward’’. 79 In the next pages, we outlineents conferring intellectual property rights on protein-
considerations of several proposed and critical amend-based therapeutics will have significant implications for
ments to current intellectual property regimes. We alsohealth care treatment and delivery. 73
examine the proposed regulatory framework for genetic
Again, overly broad gene patents have the potential patents.
of skewing research agendas. A critical underlying prin-
ciple in the enforcement of intellectual property regimes
regarding genetic sequences is the significant potential Stringent Utility Requirements 
for economic gain. A significant portion of biomedical Amendments should be made to promote further
research is private, and the primary impetus for con- innovation in downstream research development by
tinued private research and innovation is capital earn- restricting the patenting of certain upstream gene
ings. As a result, research efforts are primarily directed at sequences. Patents granting exclusive rights on genetic
projects designed to develop and market commercial material that has not been fully characterized inhibits, or
products. Such commercially-oriented research does not at the very least, delays further research concerning a
generally produce the innovative impact within the sci- gene and its related biological mechanisms. Restricting
entific community as research designed at characterizing patents on partially characterized sequences and gene
basic biochemical and genetic processes. In addition, the fragments diminishes overlapping claims and provides a
exclusive monopoly granted by genetic patents delays clear scope for patent rights. This aim could be achieved
general research into further study of biochemical and by mandating that patent offices issue patents only in
genetic mechanisms. Basic molecular research that is not cases where the gene sequence has been sufficiently char-
predicated on producing commercial products will likely acterized and a substantial utility has been clearly identi-
provide a more distinct scientific understanding of bio- fied. 80 It is common knowledge that the patent offices
chemical pathways and significant contributions to would not issue patents to mechanical inventions of
advances in biomedical research. 74 dubious or uncertain utility. There is no reason why a
Universities have historically provided significant comparative attitude or stance should not be adopted in
contributions to basic research initiatives. Recently, a respect of genetic patents.
✄
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The USPTO has recently issued utility examination equal rigor to genetic patents. Under present patent law
guidelines with respect to biotechnology patent applica- an application that satisfies the utility requirement for a
tions. 81 These guidelines call for stricter application of genetic patent restricts all other parties from using the
the utility requirement. The guidelines mandate that a genetic material in any method. The monopoly granted
patent applicant provide in the patent claims and sup- thereby restricts further research in areas of biomedicine
porting written description a ‘‘specific and substantial and biotechnology that involve the subject matter of the
utility’’ that would be considered credible by a person of patent.
ordinary skill in the art. 82 The credibility is assessed from
This argument has been refuted by noting that athe perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art
new use for that genetic material may qualify for a sepa-provided with the patent application and any relevant
rate patent application, regardless of the fact that theevidence on record, including experimental data, expert
gene itself has been patented in a previous application.opinions, and previous scientific literature. 83 Only one
Inasmuch as this accords with the law,89 this reasoningcredible ‘‘specific and substantial utility’’ is required for a
ignores the reality that new uses for genetic materialpatent application. As a result of these guidelines, a
invariably require research using the patented material.patent application for a gene sequence that has a claimed
University and public research institutions may qualifyutility in hybridization techniques for identifying a par-
under an experimental use exemption to conductticular gene marker must be able to identify a specific
research on patented genetic material. If a new use isgene loci. 84 The USPTO guidelines may also further
discovered, normally a patent application will be filed onrequire that the gene probe be related to specific disease
the basis of this new use. Commercial marketing of theresearch or a specific application. 85 For example, a gene
patent will likely be pursued as a means for recoveringprobe may be required to identify a specific disease-
research expenditures and funding further research. 90 Inrelated gene mutation. The specific and substantial
such circumstances, the original patent holder likely hasutility requirement is intended to prevent ‘‘throwaway’’,
a basis for a patent infringement suit, as research exemp-‘‘insubstantial’’, or ‘‘non-specific’’ uses from fulfilling the
tions are generally limited to bona fide research uses thatutility requirement under § 101 of the U.S. Patent Act. 86
are not designed for profit taking.If the ‘‘specific and substantial utility’’ requirement
is not met, examiners are instructed to reject the applica- For private research groups, no such protection is
tion under § 101 for lack of utility and under § 112 for possible. Research into new uses for gene sequences in
failure to fully disclose the invention in the specifications biotechnology, and particularly medical research, cannot
due to a lack of a specific and substantial utility. A patent viably be pursued without infringing exclusive patent
rejection based on § 101 and § 112 places the burden rights. This may have dramatic consequences in delaying
on the applicant to provide further evidence to ‘‘establish advances in health care that are based on genetic
a probative relation between the submitted evidence research, as patent holders effectively control not only
and the originally disclosed properties of the claimed the marketing of a specific genetic patent, but can restrict
invention’’. 87 In circumstances where the examiner has further research within entire fields of study for patented
concluded the applicant has not provided a specific and gene sequences that are involved in numerous other
substantial utility, a prima facie showing must establish biochemical and disease-related pathways.
that it is more likely than not that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would not consider that any utility This argument is further supported when consid-
asserted by the applicant would be specific and substan- ering that a patent on a specific genetic sequence essen-
tial. 88 This prima facie showing must include a full expla- tially grants a twenty-year monopoly to a patent holder
nation of reasoning supported by factual findings, and an on further uses that may not have been contemplated by
assessment of relevant evidence on record, including any the applicant at the time of the original application.
utilities from previous relevant art. While a patent holder is granted exclusive rights to
The guidelines also stipulate that statements of fact research a particular gene sequence, any further substan-
made by applicants in relation to utilities asserted in the tial uses that arise from additional research may be
claim must be considered true statements unless evi- monopolized by a firm or group of firms holding exclu-
dence to the contrary exists that would provide a legiti- sive licences. Although this seems readily justified, it
mate basis for a person of ordinary skill in the art to must be considered that other research groups are effec-
doubt the validity of such factual statements. Examiners tively prevented from furthering scientific progress
must also accept qualified expert opinion based on rele- within exclusive patent protected areas of research. It is
vant facts unless there is a basis to question the accuracy not unlike the effects of granting a limited monopoly on
of such expert opinion. Several commentators submit a mere scientific principle, and allowing limited firms
that the scope of a genetic patent claim should be access to research and patent innovations based on that
restricted to those uses that are disclosed in the patent basic principle. DNA sequences form the foundation of
application and satisfy the utility requirement. This sug- all biochemical processes. DNA and RNA constitute the
gestion accords with the law in respect of patents on underlying framework for protein production, enzyme
mechanical inventions and ought to be applied with and hormone regulation, and basic cellular processes.
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The Scramble for Speculative and Overly Broad Genetic Patents 91
Granting somewhat exclusive rights to such principal effect be granted a monopoly on future uses and func-
subject matter carries significant consequences. 91 tions that have not been contemplated at the time of
application. In addition to flying in the face of patentConcern has also been expressed over the use of law, such a scheme is contrary to scientific innovationcomputer analysis of genetic sequence data based upon and the interests of society. It replaces certainty withhomology, or sequence similarity, to previously discov- conjecture.ered gene sequences and patent utility submissions
The USPTO guidelines state that the nature andbased on such data. Gene homology comparison is a
degree of sequence homology data will be considered byregularly used tool in studying gene and protein func-
examiners, and in circumstances where a class of genestion. The sequence of a gene or gene fragment, or the
share a specific, substantial, and credible utility, assign-protein product sequence of the gene, can be compared,
ment of a gene included in a patent application to theusing online research tools, with all other previously
class based on homology will impute the shared specific,sequenced and characterized gene families to determine
substantial, and credible utility to the assigned gene. Thissequence homology. Preliminary gene functional assign-
stipulation is important, as simply imputing a biologicalments are made based on substantial homology with
role based on sequence homology will not satisfy theconserved families of genes that share biological func-
utility requirement unless the class of genes share a spe-tions. There is credible scientific concern that sequence
cific, substantial, and credible utility. The UPSTO Utilityhomology analysis is unreliable and should not form the
Guidelines state that ‘‘reasonable assignment of a newbasis of an alleged assignment of gene function. Even in
protein to the class of sufficiently conserved proteins’’circumstances where such analysis provides a reasonable
will impute the same specific, substantial, and crediblegeneral function, commentators have argued such puta-
utility to the novel protein. 92tive assignment does not assess the actual biological role
of the gene sequence and protein product and therefore In circumstances where the protein products of a
patent examiners should not consider such evidence in family of genes share major structural features but do not
determining utility requirements. An additional submis- share a specific, substantial, and credible utility, assign-
sion is that if such homology-based utility analysis is ment of a gene to the class will not impute a specific,
employed, the genetic sequence should be considered substantial, and credible utility to the novel gene. The
obvious with respect to prior art. interpretation of ‘‘ reasonable assignment ’’ is not
expanded upon, and no quantitative basis for satisfyingThe claim that an alleged utility based on homology
this requirement is mentioned. Certainly a gene maydata would render a genetic patent application obvious
share certain conserved domains with a family of con-with respect to previous art can be dismissed by noting
served genes, but the degree of homology must be sub-that assessing the non-obviousness requirement is a com-
stantial in order for a putative function to be assignedpletely separate determination from analyzing the utility
based on the comparison. The opportunity exists forrequirement. The basis for the rejection of a patent appli-
patent applicants to base an alleged utility solely oncation must include reasoned determinations based on
homology with a class of sufficiently conserved proteinsthe facts, with reliance on scientific data and evidence.
that share a specific, substantial, and credible utility, inStructure and function assignment derived from
circumstances of low homology that do not in fact sup-sequence homology data is a widely used research tool
port a proper basis for the alleged utility.that is grounded in plausible scientific principles. Exam-
iners must consider such data in assessing the utility As recently suggested by the Government of
requirement in a patent application. Such evidence is not Ontario in their report, the Canadian Intellectual Prop-
conclusive in satisfying utility requirements and should erty Office should adopt guidelines similar to those of
be provided in conjunction with other evidence by the the USPTO.93 Although such guidelines do not have the
applicant. force of law, such reform could be readily accomplished
within existing intellectual property laws and would notWithout sufficient evidence to rebut homology-
require extensive legislative measures.based putative functional use claims, the data should be
accepted and considered together with the materials
submitted with a patent application. The utility require- Legislative Reform ment should not be satisfied simply on the basis of a
putative, general biological function derived from a The Supreme Court of Canada recently held in
homology search. An applicant would be rewarded with Harvard College that it is Parliament’s role, and not the
exclusive rights to a genetic sequence before a complete role of the Canadian Patent Office or the courts, to deter-
understanding of a biochemical role, and research into mine the question of whether higher life forms are pat-
possible therapeutic and diagnostic applications, has entable. 94 The role of the patent office is simply to deter-
been elucidated. This situation is clearly contrary to the mine whether  patent  appl icat ions  meet  the
function of patent law in stimulating innovation. A pri- requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility
vate research group that receives a patent on a gene under the Patent Act. The Supreme Court of Canada
sequence based simply on homology analysis will in resolved the issue of whether higher life forms are
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submission of information required under any law ofincluded under the definition of ‘‘invention’’ in s. 2 of
Canada, a province or a country other than Canada thatthe Patent Act. Clearly, the patentability of genetic
regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of anysequences is a complex issue and requires carefully product. 99
drafted legislative responses. A required element of legis-
Commentators have also called for amendments tolative reform is a redrafted research exemption in the
U.S. law with regard to research exemptions. 100 AlthoughCanadian Patent Act. Considering the necessity of infor-
there is a limited statutory experimental research exemp-mation and technology sharing for innovation and
tion in U.S. law permitting clinical trials under §development within biomedicine and biotechnology, a
271(e)(1), there is no general statutory experimental usecompulsory licensing system including private and
exemption. According to this provision,public research firms must be established. Further, a
§  271(e)(1) It shall not be an act of infringement topatent pool for genetic patents must be contemplated,
make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States orconsidering the benefits possible from regulated tech- import into the United States a patented invention (other
nology patent pools. than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as
those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarilyAmendments to Research Exemptions 
manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
Preliminary studies and evidence suggest that con- hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site spe-
cific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reason-siderations of potential patent infringement with the
ably related to the development and submission of informa-lack of a clear research exemption have detracted from
tion under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,basic research. 95 Lack of a clear definition of patent use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 101
infringing activity within the research community has
The patent laws of the United Kingdom and Ger-also led to a general lack of disclosure in the scientific
many contain research exemptions broader than thosecommunity. The Canadian Patent Act must therefore be
under the Canadian Patent Act. The United Kingdom,amended to include a specific research exemption that
Germany, and other European countries conform to theclearly outlines the boundaries of such an exemption.
principles of the Convention for the European Patent forThe purpose of this exemption will ensure that
the Common Market (CPC). 102 Under Article 31 of theresearchers have a clear understanding of their rights, but
CPC, experimental exemptions are granted for uses ofmore importantly, will prevent the forestalling of signifi-
patented subject matter of a private and non-commercialcant and essential medical research.
nature, and for experimental research relating to the sub-
In Smith Kline & French Inter-American Corp. v. ject matter of the patent. 103 The CPC has not been rati-Micro Chemicals, 96 the Supreme Court of Canada dealt fied by countries of the European Community. If ratified
with an alleged infringing use of a patent and fashioned it will provide effective patent protection for an applicant
an experimental use exemption. The licensee had in all countries of the European Union.104
infringed the patent through experimental use prior to
The United Kingdom Patents Act provides forthe effective date of a compulsory licence. The Court
experimental use exemptions under two categories. 105held that the use of the patent was not for profit but
Under s. 60(5)(a), exemption is provided for acts ‘‘donerather a bona fide use to ensure the licensee could com-
privately and for purposes which are not commercial’’. 106mercially manufacture the product in accordance with
Under s. 60(5)(b), experimental exemption is also pro-the specifications of the licensor’s patent. The Court held
vided for acts ‘‘done for experimental purposes relatingthis was a logical result of the right to apply for a licence
to the subject matter of the invention’’. 107 These provi-and could not constitute an infringing use. The scope of
sions exempt experimental research designed to improveprotection afforded under the experimental research
or modify the patented subject matter in order toexemption in Smith Kline is unclear, especially since
examine the extent of the patent claims, but prohibitcompulsory licensing provisions have been removed in
research examining commercial production of the pat-Canada.
ented subject matter. 108 German patent use exemptionsThe Patent Act was amended in 1993 to include protect personal use in the private sphere that is non-statutory experimental exemptions under s. 55.2. 97 Sec- commercial. 109 Experimental uses relating to the subjecttion 55.2(6) does not clarify the extent of the exemption matter of a patent are exempt, including uses for deter-in the context of biomedical and biotechnology mining the scope of the patent claims and for deter-research. 98 The exemption in s. 55.2(1) was enacted for mining methods for patenting around the invention.the purpose of the generic pharmaceutical industry, and The Japanese Patents Act provides an exemption for ‘‘thestates that it is not a patent infringement to make, con- working of the patented invention for experiment orstruct, use or sell a patented invention involving research study’’. 110required to satisfy federal or provincial regulatory guide-
The s. 55.2 amendments to the Canadian Patent Actlines with respect to a product. The said provision reads
have been noted in recent reports by the Canadian Bio-thus:
technology Advisory Committee and the Government ofS. 55.2 (1) It is not an infringement of a patent for any
Ontario as being insufficient in affording protection forperson to make, construct, use or sell the patented invention
solely for uses reasonably related to the development and researchers from patent infringement suits. 111 The spe-
✄
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The Scramble for Speculative and Overly Broad Genetic Patents 93
cific content of a newly proposed experimental use potential for commercial marketing involving university-
exemption in Canadian law would require input from a industrial technology transfer. Although university
number of interested parties, including private firms, research departments are generally engaged in basic
public researchers, and legal professionals. Such an research rather than commercially oriented ventures,
exemption would attempt to balance the commercial there is a growing trend to commercialize basic institu-
interests of the private sector while providing the means tional research through university-industrial transfer pro-
for continued innovation through necessary research. grams.
The issue of distinguishing between basic researchAn inherent problem in drafting an experimental
and research with commercial interests was explicitlyresearch exemption to satisfy these conflicting interests is
avoided by the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Com-the economic and commercial potential that exists for
mittee in their recent report. 115 Despite the difficulty ofcurrent research in biotechnology and biomedicine.
resolving these distinctions in drafting an experimentalObviously, private biotechnology firms could not avail
use exemption, it is essential that a clearly outlinedthemselves of an exemption to use patented subject
amendment be introduced. A possible remedy for thesematter for the purpose of commercializing further inno-
conflicts is provision for a licensing or royalty schemevations. The exemption would be primarily designed for
within an experimental research exemption. Such a pro-research centers conducting basic research in funda-
vision could provide the patent holder with a financialmental molecular biology, including public research cen-
portion of the economic capital from commercial prod-tres and universities. However, the close relationships
ucts produced as a result of patent use under the experi-that have developed between corporate firms and uni-
mental use exemption. Clearly, the structure of an exper-versities create at the very least the potential for commer-
imental exemption must be designed to serve thecial products to develop from university research. 112
purpose of promoting further research in biotechnologyIn a recent report, the Canadian Biotechnology and genetics, and must address the problem of access toAdvisory Committee recommends that the Patent Act be platform biotechnology that has arguably inhibited gen-amended with a research and experimental use exemp- eral research progress within the scientific community.tion that includes the following language:
It is not an infringement of a patent to use a patented
process or product either: Compulsory Licensing Requirements 
privately and for non-commercial processes, or Some groups have called for the implementation of
to study the subject-matter of the patented invention to mandatory licensing schemes that would ensure broad
investigate its properties, improve upon it, or create a new access to novel therapeutics and diagnostic tests. 116
product or process. 113 Licensing requirements would also provide research
The first clause restates the private and non-com- firms with access to genetic-based technologies and
mercial exemption from s. 55.2(6) of the Patent Act. The allow for greater exploitation of genetic resources
second clause expands upon the exemption in s. 55.2(6) through non-exclusive resource development .
‘‘for the purpose of experiments that relate to the subject- Mandatory licensing requirements may be included
matter of the patent’’. 114 The proposed exemption is within a patent pool regulatory scheme involving public
more expansive in the use of the term ‘‘study’’, and on a and private research centers.
literal interpretation offers greater latitude for
researchers, especially private firms, to use patented sub-
Biotechnology Patent Pools ject matter in developing further commercial products.
The USPTO has recently examined the applicationIt is clear that drafting an experimental exemption
of patent pools to biotechnology patents, 117 whichrequires at some point a choice between the competing
involve ‘‘the aggregation of intellectual property rightsvalues of promoting research while protecting intellec-
which are the subject of cross-licensing, whether they aretual property rights. In circumstances of public research
transferred directly by patentee to licensee or throughconducted by university departmental projects that
some medium, such as a joint venture, set up specificallyreceive partial or complete private funding from private
to administer the patent pool’’. 118 Under a biotechnologyinterests, it is difficult to identify research that has non-
patent pool, patent holders would engage in cross-commercial purposes. In addition, a research department
licensing agreements, facilitating the dissemination ofmay receive corporate funding for certain projects, and
technological innovations within the fields of biotech-maintain separate research-exempt projects designed for
nology and biomedical research.non-commercial purposes. It is not difficult to imagine a
patent holder commencing litigation for patent infringe- The fundamental notion in support of patent pools
ment under such circumstances regardless of the is the principle that the benefits of genetic resources will
assumed research exemption, especially if the corporate be exploited to a greater extent by groups of researchers
firm funding the related research is a competitor. Patent and organizations rather than through exclusive develop-
infringement suits may arise in circumstances where ment. Patent holders will be inclined to form patent
experimentally exempt university research provides pools that provide capital through licensing fees. The
✄
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Cohen and Boyer patents, involving recombinant DNA A patent pool system structured under the above
technology, owned by Stanford University, represent a guidelines, specific to patents on genetic material, would
licensing scheme that has benefited all licensee organiza- maximize the social and economic benefits to innovators
tions, Stanford University, and the entire biotechnology and the state, the parties subject to the contract of a
industry. 119 From 1981 to 1995, Stanford generated $139 patent. Such a regime could be introduced not only at a
million in royalties from licensing agreements. national level, but also possibly as an extension of cur-
rent international agreements such as the Agreement on
The success of this non-exclusive licensing arrange- Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs). 122
ment was based on three essential factors. First, the The introduction of an intellectual property pool for
licensing fees were inexpensive. Stanford was able to genetic patents would alleviate problems caused by the
generate large amounts of capital return because of the existence of overlapping patents and stacking licences.
enormous volume of licences granted. This vast market The development of future biotechnological and
was available because of the second essential element biomedical innovations requires the assimilation of data
that no other alternative technologies were available. from a number of genetic sequences. However, there has
Third, the technology was essential to advancing been a proliferation of patents granted on genetic
research methods in biotechnology and molecular sequences in a number of organisms. As a result, private
biology. firms and research groups are restricted in accessing pro-
prietary genetic subject matter. Moreover, many patentsAs a result, the broad, non-exclusive nature of this
have been granted on early stage, or upstream, geneticlicensing scheme allowed the recombinant DNA
sequences that require further research before down-industry, and further biotechnology and biomedical
stream practical innovations are developed.research, to develop at an exponential rate during the
1980s and 1990s. It is clear that not all licensing schemes
The rights in such upstream patents could behave such potential, as most innovations are not as crit-
licensed to private firms or public and universityical to their respective industry or as widely applicable,
research groups, with provision for reach-through licenseand alternative technologies commonly exist. However,
agreements that provide royalties to the licensor on anysuch a licensing arrangement outlines the potential ben-
downstream innovations that arise from the initial sub-efits to patent holders and further industry innovation
ject matter. A patent pool regime would provide researchfrom a patent pool, while avoiding restrictions on devel-
groups with access to platform technologies necessary toopment and significant transaction costs resulting from
pursue further developments in particular fields. Licen-exclusive technology ownership.
sors would be granted license fees or cross-licences, and
the overall development of genetic innovations would beA primary concern in a patent pool system is the
augmented through the cooperative research of patentpotential for anti-competitive behaviour practised by
pool members.participating organizations. The U.S. Department of Jus-
tice and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission recently set
Economic benefits would accrue under a patentforth Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellec-
pool system as transaction costs could be greatlytual Property (IP Guidelines). 120 These policies are struc-
reduced. The significant costs of patent infringement liti-tured to ensure that patent pools provide positive com-
gation are reduced under such a system. In addition,petitive effects and facilitate the advancement of
research firms may obtain an entire portfolio of licencestechnological innovation. According to the IP Guide-
under a particular technology and avoid the extensivelines, intellectual property pooling will provide a positive
costs of separate licences. The leverage of certain patentcompetitive environment through the formation of syn-
holders exercising exclusive rights over core technologiesergies among related technologies, reduction of transac-
is eliminated, and provisions could be included totion costs, effective allocation of technological resources,
impose reciprocal licensing of any innovations arisingand by precluding litigation proceedings. The IP Guide-
from licensed technologies.lines also note that anticompetitive behaviour may be
practised through the exclusion of organizations from a
A further benefit proposed may exist in the distribu-patent pool.
tion of risk inherent in the research and development
The U.S. Department of Justice has further sub- process in biotechnology. The obvious benefit is for
mitted the following guidelines with regard to the medium and small biotechnology firms and research
approval of patent pools: the pool participants are centres that are provided the incentive of offsetting the
restricted from aggregating competing technologies for associated financial risks. However, such benefits would
the purpose of anticompetitive pricing; the pool patents only be possible under a patent pool regime that pro-
must be valid; independent determinations are necessary vided a relative equal value for all patents and uniform
to identify those patents essential to creating synergies access to technologies within the system. It seems
among complementary technologies; and the patent apparent that large pharmaceutical and biotechnology
pool participants must not attempt to affect market firms would be reluctant to allow smaller enterprises to
prices on downstream products. 121 offset their financial risks through partnership. Pharma-
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ceutical and biotechnology firms that hold significant research and downstream product development, particu-
patent portfolios, and consistently develop products larly within the field of biotechnology, and articulated
closer to market realization, can expect to receive greater the importance of maintaining access to platform tech-
benefits from their intellectual property rights than firms nology within biomedical research. Similarly, the plu-
with less resources and lower potential for patent com- rality of the Court noted that the scheme of the current
mercialization. A patent pool regime required to induce Patent Act does not contain a sufficiently clear research
the involvement of such firms would require a benefit exemption. In addition, the court expressed concerns
sharing system that accounts for initial intellectual prop- over the potential high costs of diagnostic tests and ther-
erty investment. apeutic agents and the implications for Canadian health
care. The plurality of the Court raised these concerns toThere are reasons to doubt that the benefits realized
illustrate that the current Act is not well designed tofrom patent pools will translate directly into the field of
address the unique concerns and issues surrounding thebiomedical research. Intellectual property rights form the
patenting of higher life forms. 125basis for the economic value of pharmaceutical and bio-
technology firms, and private firms may prefer the eco- These and other issues raised by the Court innomic gains available from exclusive patent ownership. respect of the dramatic expansion of the traditionalIn addition, the lack of alternative technologies in patent system 126 underscore the need for a boldbiomedical research will provide unequal bargaining rethinking of the legislative scheme necessary to governpower among participants. Firms may be encouraged to patents on life forms. In promoting ingenuity, novelenter a patent pool and introduce invalid patents in an ideas on this issue must balance the interests of theattempt to prevent litigating the validity of such patents. society with those of the industry. While it is not theFurther, firms could receive licensing fees for technology province of the courts or the patent office to rewrite orthat is properly part of the public domain. This situation amend the norms of science, 127 it is certainly theircould readily be prevented through the use of indepen- bounden duty to enforce extant laws with vigilance anddent expertise to determine only those patents essential even-handedness bearing in mind the essence of theto complement technologies in the pool, as noted in the patent regime. Of particular importance in this context isU.S. Department of Justice guidelines. the objective of promoting the notion of universal health
A primary criticism of patent pool regimes is the care in Canada. In this biomedical age, the Canadian
potential for monopoly pricing and the encouragement philosophy of universal health care is severely threatened
of anticompetitive price fixing practices. A strict applica- by the indiscriminate granting of overly broad and spec-
tion of guidelines similar in principle to those under the ulative genetic patents.
IP Guidelines and from the U.S. Department of Justice
would prevent anticompetitive behaviour. A parallel These unique concerns raised by the majority of the
scheme of antitrust legislation would provide for prohib- Supreme Court in Harvard College regarding the issue
itive measures and penalties. Despite the problems of patenting higher life forms likewise support the posi-
inherent in structuring a complex patent pool for genetic tion that the current Patent Act is not well designed to
patents, and the potential for anticompetitive practices, accommodate genetic patents. The reasoning of the
further research is necessary to assess patent pools as a majority in Harvard College also supports the submis-
viable solution to the problem of access to platform bio- sion that novel legislative schemes are required to prop-
technologies. erly govern the patenting of genetic sequences. Further,
such specific legislative responses must balance protec-
tion of exclusive intellectual property rights under the
current regime against promoting the fundamental
notion of universal health care in Canada.Conclusion 
e have examined how the patent system evolved The field of biotechnology and biomedicine is at anW to accommodate the claims of the biotechnology early stage and its immense promise should not be
industry across the globe. 123 In Canada, it is no longer in aborted by a lax interpretation and application of con-
doubt that genetic materials are patentable. However, temporary patent laws. The basic framework for under-
the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Harvard standing biochemical processes and human disease, the
College to the effect that higher life forms do not fall human genome, has just recently been disclosed. The
under the definition of ‘‘invention’’ in s. 2 of the Patent future of research will involve characterizing thousands
Act still leaves ample room for debate on the broader of genes and protein products and myriad synergistic
legal and social implications of genetic patents. 124 In tune biochemical processes. In order for this endeavour to
with emerging global concerns on indiscriminate issu- effectively advance, which requires providing incentive
ance of patents, the Supreme Court, per Bastarache J. for scientific innovation and benefits to medicine and
observed that patents may deter future biomedical biotechnology, access to research tools is essential.
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